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Abstract 
Although previous research on apologies has shown that apologies can have many 
beneficial effects on victims’ responses, the dyadic nature of the apology process has 
largely been ignored. As a consequence, very little is known about the congruence 
between perpetrators’ willingness to apologize and victims’ willingness to receive an 
apology. In three experimental studies we showed that victims mainly want to receive an 
apology after an intentional transgression, whereas perpetrators want to offer an apology 
particularly after an unintentional transgression. As expected, these divergent apologetic 
needs among victims and perpetrators were mediated by unique emotions: guilt among 
perpetrators and anger among victims. These results suggest that an apology serves very 
different goals among victims and perpetrators, thus pointing at an apology mismatch. 
Keywords: Apologies; guilt; anger; perpetrators; transgressions; forgiveness. 
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The Apology Mismatch: Asymmetries Between Victim’s Need for Apologies and 
Perpetrator’s Willingness to Apologize 
Apologizing is an effective and widely supported response to transgressions 
(Cohen, 1999; Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Kellerman, 2006; Meijer, 1998; Tavuchis, 
1991; Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011). From an early age, people learn to apologize when 
they are responsible for a transgression (Schlenker & Darby, 1981). Victims of 
transgressions are, in turn, socialized into graciously accepting such apologies (Bennet & 
Dewberry, 1994; Risen & Gilovich, 2007). The process where apologies lead to 
reconciliation is known as the “apology-forgiveness cycle” (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; 
Tavuchis, 1991). 
The apology-forgiveness cycle is collectively rational because normative 
prescriptions for perpetrators to apologize and for victims to respond with forgiveness 
help to preserve social relationships after conflict. Whether these normative prescriptions 
actually describe an empirical reality is a question that prior research has largely failed to 
address. The apology-forgiveness cycle seems to assume (at least implicitly) that victim 
and perpetrator are both motivated to reconcile. However, empirical studies show that 
victims and perpetrators  often differ in their interpretations of critical aspects of 
transgressions, such as who is responsible for the transgression, its significance and its 
long-term effects (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Feeny & Hill, 2006; 
Mikula, Athenstaedt, Heschgl, & Heimgartner, 1998). If interpretations of conflict differ 
so much between victim and perpetrator, then are their views on the need for apologies 
congruent? 
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In this paper, we suggest that different emotions underlie the victims’ and 
perpetrators’ need for apologies: anger for the victims and guilt for the perpetrators. Since 
these emotions serve different functions and are activated by different types of situations, 
victims’ and perpetrators’ need for apologies may often be mismatched. This mismatch, 
we argue, can have important consequences for subsequent forgiveness and reconciliation 
between victim and perpetrator.  
Need for apologies among victims and perpetrators 
An apology is generally defined as a combined statement of an acknowledgement 
of wrongdoing and an expression of guilt (Lazare, 2004; Smith, 2008; Tavuchis, 1991). 
Since communicating such sentiments implies that the perpetrator believes that the 
transgression should not have happened and should not happen again, apologies also 
represent an implicit promise that the transgression will not be repeated (Kim, Dirks, & 
Cooper, 2009; Smith, 2008). Apologies, therefore, imply that perpetrators distance 
themselves from their prior actions and admit being wrong. The effectiveness of 
apologies in promoting trust and forgiveness among victims has been supported by a 
wealth of research (see e.g., Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, & Murnighan, 2002; De Cremer & 
Schouten, 2008; Exline, Deshea, & Holeman, 2007; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; 
van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011). 
It is important to note that apologies have rather different meanings for victims 
and perpetrators, and they fulfill different psychological needs. According to the needs-
based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008), transgressions deprive victims 
and perpetrators of different psychological needs. Victims may experience feelings of 
inferiority and anger in response to transgressions (Miller, 2001; Shnabel & Nadler, 
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2008). Perpetrators may suffer from fear of exclusion (Exline & Baumeister, 2000), and 
may therefore experience guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Apologies 
provide a means for addressing these impaired needs (De Cremer, Pillutla, & Reinders 
Folmer, 2010; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). However, as victims and perpetrators require 
different needs to be restored, apologies serve a different function for either party.  
For victims, apologies represent a compensation for having been victimized; a 
symbolic compensation for the injury suffered due to the offense (Tachuvis, 1991), and 
thus apologies address the state of inequity that arises when people are transgressed 
against (Exline et al., 2007). Anger is an emotion that is closely linked to a need for 
compensation and retribution (Darley and Pittman, 2003). We therefore expect that anger, 
which is central to the experience of injustice and victimization (Miller, 2001), drives 
victims’ need for apologies. To our knowledge, no research has directly tested whether 
anger predicts a victim’s need for apologies. However, there is some indirect evidence 
that supports this link. Anger has been linked to reconciliation attempts (Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007): a negative emotional reaction towards the perpetrator still leaves the 
possibility for reconciliation open. Since an apology is a reconciliation tool, one would 
expect that victims’ need for apologies is positively related to anger. 
For perpetrators, apologies are means for distancing themselves from their 
misdeeds (Goffman, 1971), and for restoring the relationship with the victim (e.g., 
Bottom, et al., 2002; Leunissen, De Cremer, & Reinders Folmer, 2012). We believe that 
guilt may play a central role in the process that makes perpetrators apologize. 
Perpetrators may experience guilt in response to having committed an interpersonal 
transgression because such a transgression poses a threat to the relationship between the 
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victim and perpetrator (Cryder, Springer, & Morewedge, 2012). The emotion of guilt, 
which is strongly related to the motivation to reconcile and improve the relationship with 
the victim (Baumeister, et al., 1994), is likely to be central to the perpetrators’ perception 
of the need for apologies. One would therefore expect that the guiltier the perpetrators 
feel, the more likely they will apologize. 
In sum, apologies provide a means to fulfill the different needs of victims and 
perpetrators in the aftermath of transgressions. However, are the victim’s and 
perpetrator’s respective needs for apologies necessarily aligned with each other, as 
suggested by the apology-forgiveness cycle? Or in other words, are apologies provided 
by perpetrators when they are required by victims? We suggest that this may not be the 
case. Since the necessity of apologies for victims and perpetrators are linked to different 
emotions, we suggest that the need for apologies may often be mismatched: apologies are 
given when victims require them least, and not when they require them most. This notion 
is best exemplified by considering the role of the intentionality of transgressions.  
Intentionality 
Intentionality refers to an individual’s desires, beliefs, awareness, and abilities to 
perform a particular action (Malle & Knobe, 1997; Malle & Nelson, 2003). An act is 
regarded as intentional if the actor sets out to perform the action and succeeds. In the case 
of transgressions, this means that the actor has willfully harmed the victim. 
Intentionality is of particular interest for the present research because it is a central 
element in the experience of transgressions and injustice. Perceptions of intentionality 
influence attributions of culpability and blameworthiness for transgressions, and people’s 
tendency to respond to them with forgiveness or retribution (Darley & Pittman, 2003; 
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Fincham, 2000; Struthers et al., 2008). Importantly, intentionality has also been shown to 
influence the emotions that underlie victims’ and perpetrators’ apology needs, namely 
anger and guilt (McGraw, 1987). Therefore, intentionality may reveal when victims’ and 
perpetrators’ need for apology do or do not align. 
How may intentionality affect the emotions that underlie the victims’ and 
perpetrators’ need for apology, and, consequently, their perceptions of that need? 
Intentional transgressions indicate that the harm suffered by the victim was due to the 
perpetrator (rather than to external circumstances). Hence they evoke more feelings of 
injustice (Darley & Pitman, 2003; Miller, 2001) and anger than unintentional 
transgressions do (Berkowitz & Heimer, 1989; Betancourt & Blair, 1992; Leary, 
Springer, Negel, Ansell, & Evans, 1998; Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996). Indeed, the 
relationship between the intentionality of the transgression and anger is one of the best-
established findings in the justice literature (Miller, 2001). Intentional transgressions 
consequently lead to a victim having a stronger desire for compensation and retribution 
(Darley & Pittman, 2003). As such, it is likely that victims desire an apology particularly 
after intentional transgressions. 
For perpetrators, the intentionality of a transgression is closely linked to guilt, 
being particularly experienced by perpetrators after unintentional transgressions 
(McGraw, 1987). According to Baumeister and colleagues (1994), there are two 
important sources of guilt. First, guilt is experienced as a result of anxiety for social 
exclusion. After an unintentional transgression, a valuable relationship is distorted 
beyond the perpetrators’ will, as such, the perpetrator experiences anxiety over social 
exclusion as the victim might decide to end the relationship with the perpetrator. This 
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anxiety results in feelings of guilt (Baumeister et al., 1994). When a perpetrator 
transgresses intentionally, the relationship with the victim is less likely to be important to 
him/her and relational deterioration is more likely to have been anticipated and 
considered acceptable. Thus, the perpetrator experiences less anxiety for social exclusion. 
Intentionality also has important consequences for feelings of guilt because the 
former influences the empathy that perpetrators feel towards the victim. In the case of an 
intentional transgression, perpetrators are aware beforehand that they will commit the 
transgression (i.e., it is expected; McGraw, 1987). The perpetrator thus has had time to 
rationalize the transgression beforehand, thereby guarding him/herself against feelings of 
guilt (Baumeister, 1999; Tsang, 2002). In contrast, unintentional transgressions come 
unexpected to the perpetrator. Therefore, he/she does not have any rationalizations ready 
to guard him/herself against feelings of guilt. In short, these processes, anxiety for social 
exclusion and rationalizations, suggest that perpetrators will experience guilt particularly 
after unintentional transgressions and as a consequence, will want to apologize 
particularly after unintentional, rather than intentional transgressions. 
In sum, these arguments lead us to predict a mismatch between the victims’ and 
the perpetrators’ need for apology. Because victims and perpetrators may desire 
apologies after different types of transgressions, this apology mismatch could have 
important consequences for reconciliation after different types of transgressions. Because 
perpetrators ultimately decide whether to apologize or not, it seems likely that apologies 
will be issued mainly after unintentional transgressions as perpetrators have the highest 
need to apologize after unintentional transgressions. In contrast, this mismatch would also 
suggest that victims are unlikely to receive apologies for transgressions for which they 
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particularly desire apologies, namely intentional transgressions. Because apologizing has 
been shown to have positive effects on forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Worthington, & 
Rachal, 1997; Ohbuchi, et al., 1989), it stands to reason that unintentional transgressions 
are forgiven more often than intentional transgressions. 
The present paper 
The aim of the present paper is to study the incongruence between perpetrators’ 
willingness to apologize and victims’ desire to receive an apology and the subsequent 
effects of this incongruence on reconciliation. We argue that the emotional processes that 
underlie the victims’ and perpetrators’ respective needs for apologies – that is guilt on the 
part of perpetrators and anger on the part of victims – may not be complementary, and as 
a consequence victims and perpetrators desire an apology at very different instances. We 
suggest that intentionality, which is uniquely associated with each of the above-
mentioned emotional process, may reveal this mismatch. This incongruence in turn may 
have important consequences for forgiveness after the transgression. We tested these 
predictions in three studies. Study 1 was an initial test of our ideas using an 
autobiographical narrative task, similar to the task designed by Baumeister and 
colleagues (1990). In study 2, we introduced another manipulation of perspective and 
intentionality relying on a vignette methodology. In study 3, we again relied on an 
autobiographical narrative tasks but this time we also included measures of actual 
apology behavior and forgiveness after the transgression in order to explicitly show the 
effects of the mismatch both on needs for apologies and behavior and subsequent 
forgiveness. 
Study 1 
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Method 
Participants and design. In total, 202 undergraduates (97 women, M(age) = 20.00, 
SD(age) = 1.72) participated in return for course credit. Participants were randomly 
assigned to a 2 (perspective: victim vs. perpetrator) × 2 (intentionality: intentional vs. 
unintentional transgression) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to recall an intentional or unintentional 
transgression of which they were either a victim or a perpetrator. 
Victims were asked: Please recall a situation in which somebody else did 
something (unintentionally / intentionally) to you that you experienced as unpleasant or 
unjust. Perpetrators were asked:  Please recall a situation in which you did something 
(unintentionally / intentionally) that this other person experienced as unpleasant or 
unjust. Next, participants were asked to write a small paragraph describing the 
transgression. Afterwards, we assessed our manipulation check, mediating variables, and 
dependent variable. 
Measures. All questions were answered on a 1 (= not at all), to 7 (= very much) 
scale. 
Manipulation check. We checked our intentionality manipulation in the 
autobiographical narratives by asking “To what extent was it the other’s / your intention 
to do something unpleasant or unjust?” 
Mediating variables. We asked participants in the victim conditions: “How angry 
were you after this other person did something unpleasant or unjust?” and participants in 
the perpetrator conditions: “How guilty did you feel after you did something unpleasant 
or unjust?” 
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Dependent variable. We assessed the need for an apology with (victim): “To 
what extent did you want to receive an apology from this other person?” and 
(perpetrators). “To what extent did you want to offer an apology to this other person?” 
Results 
In all the analyses of Studies 1, 2, and 3, categorical predictors were effect-coded 
(unintentional = -1, intentional = 1; victim = -1, perpetrator = 1). 
Manipulation check. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of perspective (b = -.51, t(198) = -4.54, p < 
.001) and a main effect of intentionality (b = .92, t(198) = 8.15, p < .001). The interaction 
effect was not significant (b = -.16, t(198) = -1.38, p = .17). Participants in the 
unintentional conditions perceived transgressions as less intentional (M = 2.22, SD = 
1.46) than participants in the intentional conditions (M = 4.05, SD = 1.88). Moreover, 
victims (M = 3.65, SD = 1.93) perceived the transgression as more intentional than the 
perpetrators did (M = 2.65, SD = 1.77). 
Need for apologies. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = -.26, t(198) = -2.09, p 
= .04), but not of perspective (p = .62). The main effect of intentionality showed that the 
need for apologies was generally higher after unintentional (M = 5.32, SD = 1.66) than 
after intentional (M = 4.81, SD = 1.99) transgressions.  
More importantly, this effect of intentionality was qualified by the predicted 
interaction between perspective and intentionality (b = -.41, t(198) = -3.25, p = .001; for 
cell means, see Table 1).  
------------------------------- 
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Insert table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Planned comparisons revealed that after an unintentional transgression, 
perpetrators were more willing to apologize than victims desired an apology (b = .47, 
t(198) = 2.63, p = .009). Conversely, when the transgression was intentional, victims 
desired an apology significantly more than perpetrators were willing to apologize (b = -
.35, t(198) = -1.96, p = .05). Perpetrators wanted to give an apology more after an 
unintentional transgression than after an intentional transgression (b = -.68, t(198) = -
3.76, p < .001). For victims, we did not find a significant difference in the need for 
apologies after intentional and unintentional transgressions (b = .15, t(198) = .83, p = 
.41).  
Mediation analyses. We hypothesized that specific emotions (i.e., anger on the 
part of the victim and guilt on the part of the perpetrator) would mediate the relationship 
between intentionality and willingness to give / receive an apology. We only measured 
anger among victims and guilt among perpetrators. We thus split our sample into victims 
and perpetrators and analyzed separately whether these specific emotions mediate the 
effect of intentionality on willingness to give/receive an apology. Mediation was tested 
using the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes (2012), using 5000 bootstrap resamples. 
The reported confidence intervals are bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals of the 
probability distribution of the indirect effect. 
Victims. A regression analysis revealed a significant (total) effect of intentionality 
on anger (b = .33, t(100) = 2.25, p = .03): victims were angrier after intentionally 
transgressions than after unintentional transgressions. We also obtained a significant 
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positive effect of anger on the willingness to receive an apology (b = .52, t(100) = 4.87, p 
< .001). Finally, the indirect effect of intentionality on the willingness to receive an 
apology, via anger, was significant (b = .17, S.E. = .10, 95% CI (two-sided): [.03; .42]), 
while the direct effect was not significant (b = -.03, S.E. = .17, t(99) = -.16, p = .87). This 
analysis shows that there is an indirect effect of intentionality through anger on the 
willingness to receive an apology. 
Perpetrators. Our analysis obtained a significant (total) effect of intentionality on 
guilt (b = -.39, t(98) = -2.55, p = .01), meaning that perpetrators felt less guilty after 
intentional than after  unintentional transgressions. Guilt also significantly influenced the 
willingness to offer an apology (b = .88, t(98) = 10.31, p < .001). Moreover, the total 
indirect effect of intentionality on apologies through guilt was significant (b = -.32, S.E. = 
.13, 95% CI (two-sided): [-1.19; -.1]). The direct effect of intentionality on need for 
apologies was also significant (b = -.36, S.E. = .13, t(97) = -2.69, p = .008). This analysis 
thus supports our prediction that perpetrators are more willing to offer an apology after an 
unintentional transgression than after an intentional one because they feel guiltier in the 
former instance than in the latter one. 
Discussion 
Study 1 was largely in line with our predictions. Perpetrators wanted to apologize 
after unintentional transgressions more than after intentional ones. This effect was 
mediated by guilt. Moreover, we found evidence for our proposed mismatch in the sense 
that perpetrators wanted to apologize significantly more than victims wanted to receive 
an apology after unintentional transgressions, while perpetrators wanted to apologize 
significantly less than victims wanted to receive an apology after intentional 
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transgressions. We did not find a significant difference between the intentional and 
unintentional conditions for victims (although the mean difference was in the right 
direction). However, the indirect effect of intentionality on victims’ need for apologies, 
mediated by anger, was significant, showing that for victims, the need for apologies is 
predicted by anger. 
Study 2 
Study 2 was designed to extend the findings of Study 1. To experimentally control 
the type of transgression, we employed a scenario study in which participants were either 
the victim or the perpetrator of the same transgression. Moreover, we wanted to provide a 
more stringent test of the emotional processes that underlie this mismatch. While Study 1 
revealed that the relationship between intentionality and need for apologies is mediated 
by anger (victims) and guilt (perpetrators), we were unable to rule out that anger could 
also play a role in the perpetrators’ willingness to apologize, and that guilt could 
influence a victims’ desire for apologies. To show conclusively that anger mediates only 
the victims’ need for apology, and that guilt mediates only for perpetrators, we measured 
both emotions in both the victim and perpetrator conditions in Study 2. 
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 248 undergraduate students (126 women, 
M(age) = 19.68, SD(age) = 1.94) participated in exchange for course credit. They were 
randomly assigned to a 2 (perspective: victim vs. perpetrator) × 2 (intentionality: 
intentional vs. unintentional transgression) between-subjects design. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with a short scenario. The scenario for the 
victims was (manipulation between brackets): Imagine the following situation. Your 
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colleague (accidentally/intentionally) breaks your coffee mug by pushing it off your desk. 
You were very fond of this coffee mug. For the perpetrator, the scenario was: You 
(accidentally/intentionally) break your colleague’s coffee mug by pushing it off your 
colleague’s desk, causing it to break. Your colleague was very fond of this coffee mug. 
After the participants read the scenario, we assessed the manipulation checks, mediators, 
and the dependent measure1. 
Measures. All questions were answered on a 1 = not at all to 7 = very much scale. 
Manipulation check. We checked our manipulation of intentionality with the 
following item: “To what extent was it (your intention / the intention of your colleague) 
to break the coffee mug?” 
Anger and guilt. We measured anger in both perspectives by asking: “How angry 
would you feel about your mug being broken?” Guilt was measured in both perspectives 
by asking: “How guilty would you feel about your mug being broken?” 
Need for apology. The need for apology was measured by asking perpetrators: 
“To what extent would you want to offer an apology to your colleague?”, and victims: 
“To what extent would you want to receive an apology from your colleague?” 
Results 
Manipulation check. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = 1.57, t(244) = 14.01, p 
< .001) and a main effect of perspective (b = -.37, t(244) = -3.26, p = .001). The 
interaction effect was not significant. Participants in the unintentional conditions 
perceived transgressions as less intentional (M = 1.46, SD = .87) than participants in the 
intentional conditions (M = 4.69, SD = 2.25). Moreover, victims (M = 3.25, SD = 2.31) 
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perceived the transgression as more intentional than perpetrators did (M = 2.57, SD = 
2.34). 
Need for apologies. A regression analysis with intentionality and perspective as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = -.24, t(244) = -2.64, p 
= .009), but not of perspective (p = .42). The main effect of intentionality showed that the 
need for apology was generally higher after unintentional (M = 5.96, SD = 1.31) than 
after intentional (M = 5.79, SD = 1.55) transgressions. 
More importantly, the effect of intentionality was qualified by the predicted cross-
over interaction between perspective and intentionality (b = -.46, t(244) = -5.00, p < .001; 
see Table 2 for cell means).  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
Planned comparisons revealed that after an unintentional transgression, 
perpetrators were more willing to apologize than victims desired an apology (b = .39, 
t(244) = 3.00, p = .003). Conversely, when the transgression was intentional, victims 
desired an apology more than perpetrators were willing to apologize (b = -.53, t(244) = -
4.07, p < .001). Perpetrators wanted to give an apology more after an unintentional 
transgression than after an intentional transgression (b = -.71, t(244) = -4.66, p < .001). 
Victims wanted to have an apology more after an intentional than after an unintentional 
transgression (b = .22, t(244) = 2.07, p = .04) 2,3. 
Anger. Regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as independent 
variables and anger as dependent variable revealed main effects on anger of perspective 
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(b = -.22, t(244) = -3.50, p < .001) and intentionality (b = .19, t(244)  = 2.97, p = .003). 
After a transgression, victims were angrier (M = 4.11, SD = 1.93) than perpetrators (M = 
3.30, SD = 1.83), and both were angrier after intentional transgressions (M = 4.36, SD = 
2.01) than after unintentional ones (M = 3.37, SD = 1.72).  These effects were qualified 
by a significant interaction effect (b = -.21, t(244) = -3.34, p = .001). Simple effects 
analyses (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003) indicated that the intentionality of the 
transgression significantly influenced anger among victims (b = .40, t(244) = 5.52, p < 
.001) but not among perpetrators (b = -.02, t(244) = -.22, p = .82). Victims were angrier 
than perpetrators after intentional transgressions (b = -.43, t(244) = -4.78, p < .001), but 
equally angry after unintentional transgressions (b = -.001, t(244) = -.11, p = .91). 
To test whether anger indeed predicts the victims’ need for an apology but not the 
perpetrators’, we conducted a regression analysis with anger and perspective as 
independent variables and need for an apology as the dependent variable. We obtained a 
significant main effect of anger (b = .65, t(244) = 7.20, p < .001), but  no significant main 
effect of perspective (b = .07, t(244) = .81, p = .42), or a significant interaction (b = .005, 
t(244) = .05, p = .96). 
Guilt. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as predictor 
variables and guilt as dependent variable yielded a significant main effect of perspective 
(b = .42, t(244) = 6.81, p < .001), indicating that after a transgression, perpetrators felt 
guiltier (M = 4.98, SD = 1.92) than victims (M = 3.19, SD = 1.95) did. We did not obtain 
a significant main effect of intentionality (b = -.10, t(244) = -1.55, p = .12), and also no 
significant interaction effect (b = -.10, t(244) = -1.66, p = .10). Simple effects analyses 
indicated that intentionality only affected guilt among perpetrators (b = -.20, t(244) = -
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1.95, p = .05), and not among victims (b = .006, t(244) = .09, p = .93). Hence, although 
the interaction term is not significant, the simple slopes analyses show a pattern on guilt 
consistent with our hypotheses. Nevertheless, these results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
To test whether guilt predicts perpetrators’, rather than victims’ need for an 
apology, we conducted a regression analysis with guilt and perspective as independent 
variables and the need for apology as dependent variable. We obtained a main effect of 
guilt (b = .28, t(244) = 6.21, p < .001) and of perspective (b = -1.46, t(244) = -6.56, p < 
.001). Importantly, we also obtained the predicted interaction effect between guilt and 
perspective (b = .28, t(244) = 6.12, p < .001). Simple effects analyses indicated that guilt 
only predicted perpetrators’ need for apologies (b = .56, t(244) = 7.47, p < .001), but not 
the need for apologies among victims (b = .003, t(244) = .07, p = .94).  
Mediation. Mediation was tested using the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes 
(2012), using 5000 bootstrap resamples. The reported confidence intervals are bias-
corrected bootstrap confidence intervals of the probability distribution of the indirect 
effect. 
We tested our model by using intentionality as the independent variable, anger 
and guilt as mediators in parallel, need for apologies as dependent variable and 
perspective as moderator, moderating the path from intentionality to anger and to guilt. In 
line with our hypotheses, we obtained for victims a significant indirect effect of anger (b 
=.24, S.E. = .06, 95% CI (two-sided): [.15; .38]) but not of guilt (b =-.001, S.E. = .02, 
95% CI (two-sided): [-.03; .04]). For perpetrators, we obtained a significant indirect 
effect of guilt (b =-.04, S.E. = .03, 95% CI: [-.12; -.0007]), but not of anger (b = -.01, 
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S.E. = .07, 95% CI (two-sided): [-.15; .12]). While the conditional direct (unmediated) 
effect of intentionality on victims’ need for apologies was not significant (b = -.05, S.E. = 
.09, t(240) = -.50, p = .62), it was for perpetrators’ apology needs (b = -.51, S.E. = .13, 
t(240) = -3.86, p < .001). The total effect of intentionality on the need for apologies was 
not significant (b = -.06, t(246) = -.93, p = .35). 
Discussion  
The results of Study 2 are consistent with our mismatch hypothesis. Victims have 
a significantly higher need for apologies than perpetrators after intentional transgressions, 
while perpetrators have a significantly higher need for apologies than victims after 
unintentional transgressions. Moreover, we find that guilt only mediates the relationship 
between intentionality and need for apologies for perpetrators, while anger mediates only 
the victims' need for apologies. 
Two findings were not in line with our hypotheses. First we did not find a 
significant interaction effect between anger and perspective on the need for apologies, 
meaning that in this study anger was predictive for the need for apologies for both victims 
and perpetrators. This might just result from testing the same effect across multiple 
studies. Even if an effect exists objectively, statistical logic dictates that some replication 
attempts will not show the effect (Schimmack, in press). A more substantial post-hoc 
explanation for this finding relates to the specific nature of this study. Specifically, 
perpetrators may have interpreted this question as being angry at themselves for the 
coffee mug being broken. This would be in line with our finding of a positive effect of 
anger on the willingness to apologize of perpetrators. A second finding that was not in 
line with our hypotheses was that, although guilt mediated the relationship between 
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intentionality and need for apologies for perpetrators, there was still a significant direct 
(i.e., unmediated) effect of intentionality on the need for apologies. This finding suggests 
that other mechanisms, besides guilt, may also play a role in the effects of intentionality 
on the willingness to apologize. Moral disengagement might be a likely mechanism, such 
as victim derogation. 
Study 3 
We conducted Study 3 to test whether the results of Study 1 and 2 can be 
generalized to a different population (i.e., working adults). This would strengthen the 
relevance and scope of the mismatch between victim’s and perpetrator’s need for 
apologies. A second reason for conducting Study 3 is our aim to gain more insight into 
actual apology behavior and subsequent forgiveness. As explained in the introduction, 
apologies generally lead to forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 
1997). As such, we predicted that the transgression would more likely be forgiven after 
an apology than when no apology is given. Because apologies are more likely to be 
offered after unintentional than after intentional transgressions, this would also imply that 
unintentional transgressions are more likely to be forgiven than intentional transgressions.  
Method 
Participants and design. A total of 383 working adults (286 women, M(age) = 
37.36, SD(age) = 10.5) were recruited through an online research participation scheme of a 
European distance-learning university. They participated for course credit. The 
participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (victim vs. perpetrator) × 2 (intentional vs. 
unintentional transgression) between-subjects design. 
THE APOLOGY MISMATCH 
 
21 
Procedure. This study was conducted on the Internet and we used the same 
instructions as for the autobiographical narratives in Study 1, but in this case, we asked 
the participants to recall a transgression from their own workplace. 
Measures. Unless otherwise specified, all measured were answered on a 1 = not 
at all, to 7 = very much scale. The manipulation check and the need for apologies were 
measured in the same way as in Study 1. Anger and guilt were measured for both victims 
and perpetrators. In order to measure anger, we asked: “How angry were you after 
you/this other person did something unpleasant or unjust?” To measure guilt, we asked: 
“How guilty did you feel after you/this other person did something unpleasant or unjust?” 
Apology behavior. To measure whether an apology was issued or not after the 
transgression, we asked victims: “Did you receive an apology from this other person?”, 
and we asked perpetrators: “Did you offer an apology to the other person?” The answer 
scale was dichotomous: Yes or No. 
Forgiveness. To check whether the transgressions were eventually forgiven or 
not, we asked victims: “I have forgiven the other person for what he/she did.” and 
perpetrators: “The other has forgiven me for what I did.” 
Results 
Manipulation check. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = 3.27, t(379) = 5.89, p < 
.001). The main effect of perspective was not significant (p = .45). Participants in the 
unintentional conditions perceived transgressions as less intentional (M = 1.81, SD = 
1.43) than participants in the intentional conditions (M = 3.54, SD = 2.10). We also 
obtained an interaction between intentionality and perspective (b = -1.03, t(379) = -2.93, 
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p = .004). This effect revealed the intentionality manipulation to be stronger among 
victims (M(intentional) = 4.35, SD = 1.94; M(unintentional) = 2.11, SD = 1.49) than among 
perpetrators (M(intentional) = 2.72, SD(intentional)  = 1.94; M(unintentional) = 1.51, SD(unintentional) = 
1.32). Nevertheless, both victims (b = 2.24, t(379) = 9.02, p < .001) and perpetrators (b = 
1.21, t(379) = 4.90, p < .001) rated the intentional transgressions as clearly being more 
intentional than the unintentional transgressions. Our hypotheses imply variations in the 
direction of the effect of intentionality for victims versus perpetrators. Hence, we do not 
consider these results for the manipulation check to be problematic because they indicate 
variations in the strength of an effect that is in the same direction for victims and 
perpetrators. 
Content coding of the perpetration stories. As an additional manipulation check 
for the perpetrator conditions, we had all the perpetrator stories of Study 1 and 3 (the two 
autobiographical narrative studies) coded by a coder blind to the original conditions and 
our hypotheses. An additional 20 percent was coded by a second coder to check for inter 
rater reliability.  
The stories were coded in four categories, in line with the categorization of Darley 
and Pittman (2003): accidental, negligent, reckless, and intentional. In addition to this 
forced-choice categorization, we also had the coders rate each story on a 1 to 7 scale on 
the extent to which the transgression was accidental, negligent, reckless or intentional. A 
Chi-square analysis on the categorization of the transgression stories between the two 
coders showed a highly significant relationship between the two coders (Χ2(9) = 126.23, 
p < .001). Correlations between the Likert scales were all high: accidental: r = .86, p < 
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.001; intentional:  r = .92, p < .001; negligent: r = .79, p < .001; reckless: r = .74, p < 
.001. 
Of the stories, 74 were coded as accidental, 164 were coded as intentional, 24 
were coded as negligent and 14 were coded as reckless;  16 were uncodable. These 16 
cases were omitted from further analyses. This left a total of 276 cases. Of the stories 
written in the intentional experimental conditions, 85% was coded as intentional, 1% was 
coded as accidental, 3% was coded as negligent and 4 % was coded as reckless. Of the 
stories written in the unintentional conditions, 52% was coded as accidental, 25% was 
coded as intentional, 15% was coded as negligent and 6% was coded as reckless. 
Excluding those participants whose stories were not in line with the experimental 
condition (e.g. described an intentional transgression in the unintentional condition), did 
not change the data patterns presented hereafter. 
Need for apologies. A regression analysis with intentionality and perspective as 
independent variables revealed a main effect of intentionality (b = -.26, t(379) = -2.55, p 
= .01) and perspective (b = -.32, t(379) = -3.11, p = .002). The main effect of 
intentionality showed that the need for apologies was generally stronger after 
unintentional (M = 4.52, SD = 2.08) than after intentional (M = 4.00, SD = 2.14) 
transgressions. The main effect of perspective indicated that victims (M = 4.60, SD = 
2.08) generally had a stronger need for apologies than perpetrators (M = 3.89, SD = 2.21). 
More importantly, we also obtained the predicted interaction between perspective 
and intentionality (b = -.58, t(379) = -5.64, p < .001; see Table 3 for cell means).  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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Planned comparisons revealed that victims wanted to receive an apology more 
after an intentional than after an unintentional transgression (b = .32, t(379) = 2.18, p = 
.03). Perpetrators wanted to give an apology more after unintentional than after 
intentional transgressions (b = -.84, t(379) = -5.80, p < .001). In line with the mismatch 
hypothesis, we found that perpetrators were somewhat more willing to apologize than 
victims desired an apology after an unintentional transgression (b = .26, t(379) = 1.74, p 
= .08). Although, the pattern in is the hypothesized direction, the difference is not 
significant and should be interpreted with caution. Conversely, when the transgression 
was intentional, victims desired an apology significantly more than perpetrators were 
willing to apologize (b = -.90, t(379) = -6.40, p < .001). 
Anger. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as independent 
variables and anger as dependent variable revealed main effects on anger of perspective 
(b = -.56, t(379) = -13.33, p < .001) and intentionality (b = .15, t(379)  = 3.72, p < .001). 
After a transgression, victims were angrier (M = 5.45, SD = 1.40) than perpetrators (M = 
3.19, SD = 1.90), and both were angrier after intentional (M = 4.61, SD = 2.00) than after 
unintentional transgressions (M = 3.98, SD = 1.99).  These effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction effect (b = -.08, t(379)  = -1.93, p = .05). Simple effects analyses 
indicated that victims were significantly angrier after intentional than unintentional 
transgressions (b = .24, t(379)  = 3.99, p < .001). We did not find any effect on anger 
among perpetrators (b = .07, t(379)  = 1.27, p = .21). 
To test whether anger indeed predicts the need for an apology for victims but not 
for perpetrators, we conducted a regression analysis with anger and perspective as 
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independent variables and need for an apology as the dependent variable. We obtained a 
significant interaction of anger and perspective (b = -.50, t(379)  = -5.67, p < .001). A 
simple effects analysis indicated that anger only predicted the need for an apology for 
victims (b = .59, t(379)  = 5.99, p < .001), and not for perpetrators (b = -.10, t (379) = -
1.44, p = .15). We also obtained a main effect of anger (b = .24, t(379)  = 3.97, p < .001), 
indicating that participants generally perceived a greater need for apologies as they 
became angrier. 
Guilt. A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as predictors and 
guilt as dependent variable yielded significant main effects of perspective (b = .48, t(379) 
= 10.74, p < .001) and intentionality (b = -.11, t(379)  = -2.40, p = .02). After a 
transgression, perpetrators felt guiltier (M = 4.04, SD = 1.96) than victims (M = 2.15, SD 
= 1.58), and both felt guiltier after unintentional (M = 3.33, SD = 2.11) than after 
intentional transgressions (M = 2.89, SD = 1.91). These effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction effect between perspective and intentionality (b = -.13, t(379) = -
2.99, p = .003; see Table 3 for cell means). Simple slopes analyses indicated that 
perpetrators felt guiltier after unintentional than after intentional transgressions (b = -.24, 
t(379) = -3.81, p < .001). We found no effect on guilt among victims (b = .01, t(379) = 
.47, p = .64). 
To test whether guilt predicts the need for an apology for perpetrators but not for 
victims, we conducted a regression analysis with guilt and perspective as independent 
variables and need for an apology as dependent variable. We obtained the predicted 
interaction effect between guilt and perspective (b = .40, t(379)  = 9.15, p < .001). Simple 
slopes analyses indicated that guilt only predicted the need for apologies for perpetrators 
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(b = .77, t(397)  = 12.47, p < .001), and not for victims (b = -.13, t(379)  = -1.71, p = .09). 
We also obtained a main effect of guilt (b = .32, t(379)  = 6.49, p < .001), indicating that 
participants perceived a greater need for apologies as they felt guiltier. 
Mediation analyses. Mediation was tested using the PROCESS macro developed 
by Hayes (2012), using 5000 bootstrap resamples2. Like in the previous studies, the 
reported confidence intervals are bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals of the 
probability distribution of the indirect effect. 
We tested our model by using intentionality as the independent variable, anger 
and guilt as mediators in parallel, need for apologies as dependent variable and 
perspective as moderator, moderating the paths from intentionality to anger and to guilt 
and the paths from anger to need for apologies and guilt to need for apologies. In line 
with our hypotheses, for victims, we obtained a significant indirect effect of anger (b = 
.14, S.E. = .04, 95% CI (two-sided): [.07; .22]) but not of guilt (b = -.003, S.E.  = .008, 
95% CI (two-sided): [-.03; .008]). For perpetrators, we obtained a significant indirect 
effect of guilt (b = -.18, S.E. = .05, 95% CI (two-sided): [-.28; -.08]), but not of anger (b 
= -.01, S.E. = .01, 95% CI (two-sided): [-.04; .008]). The conditional direct (unmediated) 
effect of intentionality on need for apologies for victims was not significant (b = -.03, 
S.E. = .12, t(382) = .28, p = 78), while the conditional direct effect for perpetrators was 
significant (b = -.41, S.E. = .11, t(382) = -3.63, p < .001). The total effect of intentionality 
on the need for apologies was also significant (b = -.12, t(381) = -2.43, p = .02). 
Need for apologies predicting apology behavior. One of the reasons to conduct 
Study 3 was to investigate the behavioral implications of the apology mismatch. As 
explained in the introduction, because perpetrators have the highest need for apologies 
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and unintentional transgressions and perpetrator ultimately decide whether to apologize 
our not, we expected that a perpetrator’s need for apologies would be predictive of 
whether an apology was issued or not. A logistic regression analysis with perspective and 
need for apologies as independent variables and apology behavior as dependent variable 
indicated a main effect of need for apologies (b = 1.19, Wald = 56.24, p < .001) and 
perspective (b = .45, Wald = 11.35, p = .001). We also found a significant interaction 
between need for apologies and perspective (b = -1.75, Wald = 30.51, p < .001), showing 
that need for apologies was only predictive for whether an apology was issued for 
perpetrators (b = 2.06, Wald = 59.73, p < .001), but not for victims (b = .31, Wald = 3.36, 
p = .07). 
Intentionality predicting apology behavior. Because perpetrators have the 
highest need for apologies after unintentional transgressions, we expected that apologies 
are mainly issued after unintentional transgressions. A  logistic regression analysis with 
perspective and intentionality as independent variables and apology issued as dependent 
variable yielded a main effect of intentionality (b = 1.15, Wald = 14.53, p < .001). 
Neither the effect of perspective nor the interaction effect was significant.  
Because in logistic regression analysis lower order “main effects” are contingent 
upon the interaction term (Jaccard, 2001), we tested a model without the interaction term 
between perspective and intentionality. This analysis showed that compared to 
unintentional transgressions, the chance of an apology being issued after an intentional 
transgression becomes significantly smaller (b = 1.18, Wald = 29.04, p < .001, odds ratio 
= 3.25): the likelihood of an apology being issued after an intentional transgression is 
significantly less than 50% (b = -.94, Wald = 35.84, p < .001, odds = .39, percentage 
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likelihood 28%). After an unintentional transgression, the likelihood of an apology being 
issued was equivalent to an apology not being issued at all (b = .24, Wald = 2.47, p = .12, 
odds = 1.27, percentage likelihood 56%). 
Effect of apologies on forgiveness. As previous research has shown that 
apologies aid in being forgiven, we expected that perpetrators who apologized would be 
forgiven more than perpetrators who did not apologize. A regression analysis with 
apology issued (effect coded: no = -1; yes = 1), perspective, and intentionality as 
independent variables and forgiveness as dependent variable showed a significant main 
effect on forgiveness of apology issued (b = .81, t(375) = 8.81, p < .001), of intentionality 
(b = -.27, t(375) = 2.93, p = .004), and of perspective (b = -.21, t(375) = -2.33, p = .02). 
Transgressions were generally forgiven more after an apology was issued (M = 5.92, SD 
= 1.36) than if an apology was not issued (M = 4.2, SD = 1.90); unintentional 
transgressions are generally forgiven more (M = 5.44, SD = 1.71) than intentional 
transgressions (M = 4.44, SD = 1.94); and victims indicated they had forgiven the 
perpetrator more (M = 4.99, SD = 1.86) than perpetrators indicated that they were 
forgiven (M = 4.83, SD = 1.94). Neither the two-way interactions nor the three-way 
interaction were significant (p > .25). 
Discussion 
The results of Study 3 extend our model in a number of ways. First, we replicated 
our previous findings in a different population (i.e., employees). Second, in line with our 
model, we could also show that the mismatch has consequences for actual apology 
behavior and subsequent forgiveness. Whether an apology is issued or not is predicted by 
the perpetrator’s need for apologies and not by the victim’s needs. Indeed, since the 
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perpetrator’s need for apologies is higher after unintentional transgressions than after 
intentional ones, apologies were issued more often after unintentional than after 
intentional transgressions. This also means that victims are unlikely to receive an apology 
when they have a high need for an apology and that the victim’s need for an apology is 
not taken into account by the perpetrator when deciding whether to apologize or not. 
Finally, we were able to show that the apology mismatch has consequences for whether 
perpetrators are forgiven or not. Perpetrators are forgiven more when they apologize. As 
such, unintentional transgressions are forgiven more than intentional transgressions. 
General Discussion 
We showed across three studies that perpetrators and victims have different needs 
for apology, depending on the intentionality of the transgression. Victims have a stronger 
preference for an apology after intentional transgressions than after unintentional ones. 
This effect is mediated by anger: victims become angrier after intentional than after 
unintentional transgressions, and therefore desire apologies more. For perpetrators, 
intentionality affects the need for apology in the opposite direction: perpetrators prefer to 
apologize after unintentional than after intentional transgressions, partly because they feel 
guiltier after unintentional transgressions. Moreover, in Study 3 we showed that apologies 
are indeed issued more after unintentional than after intentional transgressions; behavior 
that is in line with the perpetrator’s need for apologies but has no relationship to the 
victim’s need for apologies. An apology in turn does lead to more forgiveness by the 
victim, as such perpetrators are forgiven more after unintentional than after intentional 
transgressions. 
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In the introduction of this paper, we argued that the apology-forgiveness cycle 
may not always represent an empirical reality as the victim’s and perpetrator’s 
perspectives on transgression are so divergent. Our findings highlight that the initiation 
and success of the apology-forgiveness cycle is highly dependent on the intentionality of 
the transgression. Perpetrators are particularly motivated to initiate the apology-
forgiveness cycle by apologizing after unintentional transgressions. As such, 
unintentional transgressions are forgiven more often than intentional ones. However, in 
these situations (i.e., unintentional transgressions) victims are not very angry. Hence, the 
increased forgiveness after unintentional transgressions seems to be a joint effect of an 
apology and a relatively mild emotional reaction on the part of the victim. In situations 
where victims experience the greatest injustice and particularly desire apologies – after 
intentional transgressions – perpetrators are far less likely to apologize. Yet, after 
intentional transgressions, a victim’s need for apologies seems to have little influence on 
whether an apology is issued or not. Indeed, in these situations, the absence of an apology 
may even increase victims’ anger (Ohbuchi et al., 1989). This in turn increases the risk of 
further escalation of the conflict. As such, intentional transgressions pose the greatest 
challenge for mediation and reconciliation initiatives because of the strong emotional 
reactions of victims combined with very incongruent reconciliatory motivations of the 
perpetrator. 
It is interesting to note that although we find that victims generally want an 
apology more after intentional than after unintentional transgressions, related research on 
the effects of apologies paradoxically shows that that apologies may be of little value or 
even be counterproductive after intentional transgressions (Struthers et al., 2008). As 
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such, victims particularly desire an apology after intentional transgressions but at the 
same time, apologies seem to have limited impact in those situations. What is a possible 
explanation for these incongruent findings regarding the need for apologies and the actual 
effect of apologies on victims after intentional transgressions? One potential explanation 
may be found in the role of forecasting errors in the apology process, whereby victims 
believe that they will be content if they receive an apology, but when they have actually 
received one, are less satisfied than they thought they would be (De Cremer et al., 2010). 
These findings again demonstrate the challenge of reconciliation after intentional 
transgressions: even when victims receive an apology after an intentional transgression 
(i.e., the perpetrator initiates the cycle), this may not necessarily mean that the apology is 
reciprocated with forgiveness. 
The role of guilt in the perpetrator’s willingness to apologize 
Our studies showed a clear connection between feelings of guilt and the 
perpetrator’s willingness to apologize after interpersonal transgressions. This is in line 
with recent conceptualizations of guilt, which have stressed the interpersonal effects of 
guilt, arguing that guilt motivates people to take relationship-restoring action (Baumeister 
et al., 1994; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). Our findings connect well with this research, 
showing that indeed apologies as a tool for reconciliation are predicted by feelings of 
guilt. Focusing on the relationship between guilt and apologies therefore seems to be a 
promising avenue for future research on apologizing.  
In this context, it is also important to distinguish guilt form other emotional 
reactions that perpetrators may feel after a transgression, such as compassion or 
sympathy. Guilt can arise when a people feel causally responsible for the harm inflicted 
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upon the victim (Baumeister, et al., 1994). As such, guilt differs from feelings of 
compassion or sympathy, which may arise when someone sees a victim suffer (i.e., from 
a third party perspective; Gayannee, 2008; Regan, 1971). Guilt only arises when people 
feel personally responsible for the harm. 
In the current set of studies, we showed that feelings of guilt have an important 
influence on the perpetrator’s willingness to apologize. The emergence of guilt in a 
perpetrator is however complex. For instance, in this research we showed that the 
intentionality of the transgression is an important predictor for feelings of guilt. 
Sometimes, however, transgressions are not easily categorized as either intentional or 
unintentional, having both intentional and unintentional characteristics. Since the 
premeditated nature of intentional transgressions provides the perpetrator with an 
opportunity to guard him/herself against feelings of guilt by means of a priori 
rationalizations (e.g., Tsang, 2002), it seems likely that unanticipated effects of 
transgressions will make a perpetrator feel guilty. For instance, intentionally throwing a 
friend into the pool during a party probably does not make the perpetrator feel guilty as 
this was a premeditated act. However, suppose the friend unbeknownst had his new 
mobile phone in his pocket, which then broke as a result of getting wet. This unexpected 
effect of the transgression is likely to make the perpetrator feel guilty. Indeed, depending 
on the rationalizations and foreseen effects of an intentional transgression, the perpetrator 
may feel guilty for specific aspects of the transgression and may decide to either 
apologize or not. 
In the present studies, we focused on guilt experienced directly after the 
transgression. However, when taking a longer time frame, the relationship between 
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intentionality and guilt may become more complex. Perpetrators may guard against 
feelings of guilt with certain rationalizations. However, it seems likely that some of those 
rationalizations are reinterpreted later by the perpetrator and then deemed inadequate. As 
such, intentional transgressions may have the potential to cause guilt at a later time. Since 
these rationalizations are not present with unintentional transgressions, we would predict 
that in the long run, perpetrators may feel guiltier about intentional than unintentional 
transgressions, and if given the choice, would want to apologize more for something they 
had done intentionally than for something they had done unintentionally. It could 
therefore be that the apology needs of victims and perpetrators become more aligned 
longer after the conflict. How long this may take is of course open to empirical 
investigation. 
Strengths and limitations 
One of the strengths of the present research is the use of a combination of 
different methodologies for answering our research questions. We combined scenario 
methodology, which gives control over the transgression and thus increasing internal 
validity (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998), with autobiographical narrative 
methodology, which is more emotionally involving and has a higher ecological validity 
(Baumeister, et al., 1990; Gonzales, Manning, & Haugen, 1992; Zechmeister, & Romero, 
2002). In addition to this pluralistic methodological strategy, we sampled both students 
and employees to test the generalizability of our results. The fact that we showed similar 
findings across these different methodologies and populations increases our confidence in 
the proposed mismatch between victims’ and perpetrators’ need for apologies.  
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A possible limitation of the present study is that we cannot be certain whether the 
task of remembering a victim episode is significantly different from remembering a 
perpetrator episode. Previous research comparing these perspectives also mentions this 
limitation (e.g., Baumeister, et al., 1990). Participants might have had self-presentational 
concerns, selecting episodes that present themselves rather positive in their role of a 
considerate victim (after an unintentional transgression) or a misunderstood perpetrator 
(after an intentional transgression).  Yet, given that we find the same effects across 
different types of methodologies (i.e., scenario methodology and autobiographical 
narrative), we feel confident that this limitation of the autobiographical narrative 
methodology has had no significant effect on our findings. 
Another important issue that must be addressed is that we only focused on a 
specific type of transgression, that is, anger-provoking transgressions. Victims can 
respond to transgressions in a number of different ways, not only with anger but also, for 
instance, with contempt and estrangement (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; McCullough, 
Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). We focused on anger-provoking transgressions because 
anger is conceptualized as an emotion that can drive reconciliation (Fischer & Roseman, 
2007). As such, the apology-forgiveness cycle seems to mainly refer to anger-inducing 
transgressions. Yet, studying how reconciliation can be achieved after contempt-inducing 
transgressions would be an interesting extension of the apology-forgiveness cycle. 
Indeed, after unintentional contempt-inducing transgressions, forgiveness may not follow 
as the victims are unwilling to reconcile. 
On the methodological side, we relied on two different items in our analyses of 
our main dependent variable: one for victims and one for perpetrators. Although a direct 
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comparison between the means on these different items (i.e., comparing perpetrator’s and 
victim’s need for apologies after intentional or unintentional transgressions) was 
important for testing our proposed mismatch, this might be problematic because these 
were in fact two different items. Nevertheless, by looking only at the data pattern within 
the victim and perpetrator conditions, it is clear that intentionality influences the need for 
apologies of victims and perpetrators in opposite directions. Since these effects are in line 
with our hypotheses, we feel confident that this comparison across the different items 
does not pose a serious threat to the validity of our findings. 
A final limitation of the current set of studies is the absence of behavioral data 
after experimentally induced transgressions. Although this would be an important 
extension of the current findings, there are some important ethical and methodological 
problems with such a design. We can experimentally create unintentional and intentional 
transgressions with the participants as victims. However, creating situations in which 
participants are the perpetrators presents important challenges due to the rather active role 
of a perpetrator compared to the passive role of a victim (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). From 
a practical perspective, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to create situations in which 
participants intentionally transgress against one another in the lab (there are methods for 
creating unintentional transgressions; Leunissen et al., 2012). Moreover, creating a 
situation in which one intentionally transgresses against another individual might be 
ethically undesirable as this would induce a substantial amount of stress on the research 
participants. Due to these considerations, we decided to test our hypotheses in scenario 
and autobiographical narrative methodologies only. 
Concluding remarks 
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Due to the interpersonal nature of conflict and reconciliation between the 
perpetrator and the victim, apologizing is a dynamic social process. Unfortunately, the 
psychological underpinnings of this dynamic process have not yet been investigated in 
much detail. Our present results show that victims and perpetrators do not necessarily 
share the same perspective regarding the function of an apology, thereby making 
reconciliation efforts more difficult than initially anticipated. 
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Footnotes 
1 A potential methodological problem of the current scenario is that participant find it 
hard to imagine the scenario happening. We included a measure for how well the 
participant could imagine the scenario from happening:” How hard was it for you to 
imagine the described situation?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). We included this item 
as a control variable in our moderated multiple mediation model. Including this control 
variable did not significantly change the results of our analysis, the indirect effects 
through anger for victims and guilt for perpetrators were still significant. 
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2 In this study, we included a measure of harm severity: (perpetrators) “To what extent 
would you feel that you harmed your colleague?”; (victims) “To what extent would you 
feel that you are harmed by your colleague?” (both are on a 1 = not at all, to 7 = very 
much scale). A regression analysis with perspective and intentionality as independent 
variables and harm severity as dependent variable indicated a significant main effect of 
perspective (b = .68, t(242) = 6.62, p < .001), intentionality (b = .56, t(242) = 5.45, p < 
.001), and a significant interaction between perspective and intentionality (b = -.27, 
t(242) = -2.63, p = .009). The main effect of perspective indicated that perpetrators (M = 
4.36, SD = 1.54) considered that they harmed the victim more severely than victims felt 
that they were harmed (M = 2.98, SD = 1.71). Moreover, intentional transgressions (M = 
4.11, SD = 1.71) were generally perceived as more harmful than unintentional 
transgressions (M = 2.80, SD = 1.60). The interaction effect indicated that only victims 
differed in their perceptions of harm severity depending on the intentionality of the 
transgression: they considered intentional transgressions (M = 3.84, SD = 1.76) 
significantly (b = .82, t(242) = 7.03, p < .001) more harmful than unintentional 
transgressions (M = 2.19, SD = 1.21). Perpetrators considered intentional (M = 4.65, SD = 
1.48) and unintentional (M = 4.07, SD = 1.56) transgressions equally (b = .29, t(242) = 
1.73, p = .09) harmful. We added harm severity both as a covariate and as an extra 
mediator in our moderated multiple mediation model. For neither of the perspectives was 
the indirect effect through harm severity significant. Moreover, in both analyses, a 
significant indirect effect through anger and guilt remained. These analyses show that 
harm severity does not explain our effects. 
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3 An alternative explanation for why perpetrators are less willing to apologize after 
intentional than after unintentional transgressions is that perpetrators might fear that their 
apology will be rejected by the victim particularly after an intentional transgression. In 
order to test this alternative explanation, we measured whether fear of rejection of the 
apology was a concern to perpetrators with “Would you feel worried that your colleague 
might reject your apology in this situation?” (1 = not at all, 7 = completely). A regression 
analysis with intentionality as independent variables did not show a significant main 
effect of intentionality. Hence, our data does not provide evidence that perpetrators were 
more worried about an apology being rejected after intentional compared to unintentional 
transgressions. Moreover, inclusion of this item in as an extra mediator did not indicate a 
significant indirect effect through this fear of rejection item, while the indirect effect 
through guilt was still significant. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Means (SD) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 1 
 Need for apologies Anger Guilt 
 Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator 
Unintentional 4.86 (1.77) 5.81 (1.39) 5.00 (1.46) 5.81 (1.14) 
Intentional 5.16 (1.85) 4.46 (2.08) 5.67 (1.53) 5.04 (1.79) 
Note: anger was only measured among victims; guilt was only measured among 
perpetrators 
 
Table 2 
Means (SD) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 2 
 Need for apologies Anger Guilt 
 Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator 
Unintentional 5.71 (1.46) 6.49 (.64) 3.38 (1.75) 3.34 (1.70) 3.17 (1.94) 5.39 (1.66) 
Intentional 6.15 (1.24) 5.08 (1.85) 4.91 (1.80) 3.25 (1.97) 3.20 (1.98) 4.55 (2.10) 
 
Table 3 
Means (SD) for need for apologies, anger, and guilt in Study 3 
 Need for apologies Anger Guilt 
 Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator Victim Perpetrator 
Unintentional 4.26 (2.04) 4.78 (2.10) 4.94 (1.56) 3.03 (1.91) 2.09 (1.45) 4.56 (1.95) 
Intentional 4.89 (1.88) 3.10 (2.00) 5.89 (1.07) 3.33 (1.89) 2.20 (1.69) 3.59 (1.87) 
 
